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INTRODUCTION
Is the suspension of environmental laws and agency regulations a
valid method by which the Louisiana Legislature can restrain the powers
it has delegated to the environmental protection agencies of the executive
branch? The 1991 Louisiana Legislature proposed eleven concurrent
resolutions authorizing the suspension' of environmental laws and agency
regulations.' The legislature passed two of the less controversial pro-
visions after changing one of them from a suspension to a directive for
the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to delay implementation
of dairy farm runoff regulations for two years.3 All eleven resolutions
were efforts to override provisions of environmental laws or regulations
which were objectionable to the legislature or particular interest groups.
The alarming nature of this exercise of legislative power is that it was
accomplished without the benefit of a gubernatorial veto.
The legislature has acted under the assumption that the suspension
power it is exercising is authorized by the Louisiana Constitution as
well as by provisions of the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act
(LAPA). 4 The constitutional suspension power emanates from Louisiana
Constitution article III, section 20, which places the power exclusively
1. Suspension is defined as "[a] temporary stop, a temporary delay, interruption,
or cessation." Suspension of a statute is defined as "[a] temporary termination of its
power of law. The suspension of a statute for.a limited time operates so as to prevent
its operation for the time; but it has not the effect of a repeal." Black's Law Dictionary
1447 (6th ed. 1990).
2. See Appendix A.
3. 1991 La. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 20 (directing the Department of
Environmental Quality to "grant a two-year extension of time to the dairy farmers of
Louisiana in order for them to comply with regulations requiring 'no runoff' oxidation
ponds"-originally a suspension but changed to a directive upon passage); 1991 La. Senate
Concurrent Resolution No. 171 (suspends until January 1, 1992 "that portion of R.S.
30:2154(B) and any other law insofar as it allows the Secretary of the Department of
Environmental Quality, or his designee, to authorize, amend, approve, transfer, or grant
a permit for any public solid or hazardous waste disposal facility or public solid waste
or sanitary landfill within two miles of the corporate limits of any municipality or the
nearest boundary line of any property on which is located a public elementary or secondary
school or health care facility licensed by the state in Rapides Parish").
4. La. R.S. 49:951-970 (1987 and Supp. 1991).
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in the legislature. The legislature's constitutional suspension power con-
tained in Louisiana Constitution article III, section 20 reads:
Only the legislature may suspend a law, and then only by the
same vote and, except for gubernatorial veto and time limitations
for introduction, according to the same procedures and for-
malities required for enactment of that law. After the effective
date of this constitution, every resolution suspending a law shall
fix the period of suspension, which shall not extend beyond the
sixtieth day after final adjournment of the next regular session.
Additionally, the LAPA authorizes a statutory suspension power as well
as nullification power over agency regulations.' Louisiana Revised Sta-
tutes 49:969 states: "[TIhe legislature, by concurrent resolution, may
nullify or suspend any rule or regulation or body of rules or regulations
adopted by a state department, agency, board, or commission." The
scope of these provisions is uncertain, however, as they relate to sus-
pensions of laws and agency regulations in general and to environmental
laws and regulations in particular.
This paper analyzes whether these constitutional and statutory pro-
visions are broad enough to allow the suspensions of environmental laws
and regulations proposed during the 1991 legislative session. In part I,
this comment describes the historical and jurisprudential development
of the constitutional and statutory suspension power. Part II addresses
possible challenges to the validity of the legislature's present use of the
suspension power to override environmental laws and agency rules. Fi-
nally, in part III, the author suggests how the Louisiana courts should
address the issues and gives possible solutions to this conflict between
the legislative and executive branches.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUSPENSION POWER
A. The Constitutional Suspension Power
The constitutional suspension power in Louisiana has not been fully
addressed by the Louisiana courts. The suspension power is best un-
derstood in light of its historical development beginning with the English
Bill of Rights, continuing through the American Revolution, and ending
with the suspension power's introduction into the Louisiana Constitution
of 1812. Additionally, the few Louisiana court cases which have ad-
dressed the suspension power and its exercise give some insight into its
scope. Finally, the debates over the suspension power and its continuation
5. La. R.S. 49:969 (1987).
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in the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 reveal the modern conceptions of
the suspension power.
1. Historical Origins of the Suspension Power
The constitutional suspension power originated in 1812 in Louisiana's
first constitution. 6 The drafters of the Louisiana Constitution of 1812
patterned it after the Kentucky Constitution of 17977 and adopted, as
its suspension power section, section 15 of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky which is still in force today.' The correlative
section of the Kentucky constitution is traceable back to the Bill of
Rights of the Virginia Constitution of 17769 and from there to, the
English Bill of Rights of 1689.10
The suspension of laws by authority of the legislature enumerated
in the English Bill of Rights was a direct result of the reign of James
II, and to a lesser extent, that of Charles II. One of the King's particular
abuses of power which the English Bill of Rights sought to correct was
"the use of the royal prerogative for the purpose of suspending and
dispensing" with laws.' ' 2 James II exercised the suspension power as
6. La. Const. of 1812, art. VI, § 17: "No power of suspending the laws of this
State shall be exercised, unless by the legislature or its authority."
7. Cecil Morgan, The First Constitution of the State of Louisiana 9 (1975). See
also Lee Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 2 (1991); William
F. Swindler, Louisiana 50, in 4-A Sources and Documents of United States Constitutions
(1975).
8. Ky. Const. § 15. "No power to suspend laws shall be exercised, unless by the
general assembly or its authority." This provision's language is almost identical to that
of La. Const. of 1812, art. VI, § 17.
9. Va. Const. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 7 (as reproduced in Richard L. Perry,
Sources of Our Liberties, 11 ABA Standing Committee on American Citizenship 10 (1959)):
"That all power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any authority, without
consent of the representatives of the people, is injurious to their rights, and ought not
to be exercised."
10. English Bill of Rights of 1689 (as reproduced in Sir Edward Creasy, The Rise
and Progress of the English Constitution 317-26 (16th ed. 1892)). The introduction reads
as follows:
Whereas the late King James II., by the assistance of divers evil counsellors,
judges, and ministers employed by him, did endeavour to subvert and extirpate
the Protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of this kingdom:-
1. By assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending of
laws, and the execution of laws, without the consent of Parliament.
Id. at 317. This section further states:
"That the pretended power of suspending of laws, or the execution of laws,
by regal authority, without consent of Parliament, is illegal."
Id. at 319.
11. Dispensing is the power to make exceptions to a law as well as the power to
pardon violators. Richard L. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties, 7 ABA Standing Committee




an extension and broadening of what the English had long recognized
as the legitimate exercise of the dispension power. 3
The Stuart kings created the suspension power by authorizing all
persons to treat particular laws as non-existent. Charles II, sympathetic
to the Catholic Church, used the dispensing and suspension power to
create a greater tolerance for religion. In a Declaration of Indulgence
in 1672, he suspended the penal laws relating to non-conformity in
religious matters. The declaration was not well received by Parliament,
and it passed legislation forbidding suspension of laws relating to re-
ligious matters and later passed less tolerant laws. Charles circumvented
this action by not enforcing laws against Catholics and thus prudently
achieved his policy of religious tolerance.'
4
James II was not as cautious as his brother, Charles II, and at-
tempted to appoint Catholics to high office. To achieve this end, he
issued his own Declarations of Indulgence in 1687 and 1688. These were
much more expansive than those of 1672. James legalized his broad use
of the dispensing power by dissolving Parliament and, having judges
loyal to him uphold his use of the dispensing power. By the time James
II fled the country after the royal army collapsed in the face of the
march of William of Orange in 1688, James II had granted the liberty
to worship in public to Catholics and Protestant dissenters and suspended
religious tests. In the Revolution Settlement with William of Orange, a
re-established Parliament condemned the suspension and dispensing power
as used by Charles II and James II, asserted the supremacy of Parliament
over the divine right claimed by the kings, and put the suspension power
and other rights in the hands of Parliament.' The English Bill of Rights
created by Parliament became an important source of many of the rights
and liberties later enjoyed by Americans.
The Bill of Rights in the Virginia Constitution of 1776 contained
the same general philosophy of individual rights found in the English
Bill of Rights.' 6 One of the guarantees to safeguard individual rights
found in Virginia's first constitution was a grant of the suspension power
to the legislature, as opposed to the executive in section 1 of the Bill
of Rights. This constitutional article asserted the ideas of Thomas Jef-
ferson that the executive authority was subordinate to the legislature
and, more ideally, in the hands of the representatives of the people. 7
Thus, the Virginia Constitution of 1776 embodied the Jeffersonian idea
13. Id.
14. Id. at 28-29.
15. Id. at 27-29. See also Creasy, supra note 10, at 299-350.
16. Perry, supra note 9, at 2.




of a subordinate executive, and drafters that followed transferred the
idea from this source to other state constitutions."
The Louisiana Constitution of 1812 contained no separate and of-
ficial "Declaration of Rights" article, but placed the protection for civil
rights under various headings. 9 In 1812, the suspension power found
in the Bill of Rights of the Kentucky Constitution of 1797 was transferred
to the "General Provisions" article (article VI) of Louisiana's first
constitution.2 ° The Louisiana Constitution of 1812 Article VI section 17
reads: "No power of suspending laws of this state shall be exercised
except by the legislature, or by its authority." This language remained
unchanged until a 1962 amendment to the 1921 constitution added
procedural qualifications for passage of a valid suspension similar to
those found in the present constitution."' The provision apparently had
been almost completely ignored by constitutional revisionists until the
Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973. Although limited, the
jurisprudential history of the suspension power in Louisiana gives some
insight into the possible limits and uses of the power before the adoption
of the present constitution.
2. Jurisprudential History and Development
There are few cases since 1812 addressing the Louisiana legislature's
exercise of the suspension power, and they are not conclusive on the
limits of the suspension power and provide only limited insight into
how the exercise of the power should be evaluated. However, the avail-
able jurisprudence does reveal how the courts have looked at the sus-
pension power in the past and helps predict how the power will be
evaluated in the future.
Johnson v. Duncan & Al. "s Syndics22 was the Louisiana Supreme
Court's first decision on the legislative exercise of the suspension power.
The case involved a directive of martial law declared by General Andrew
Jackson in 1815 during the Battle of New Orleans, as well as a legislative
act suspending "all proceedings in any civil case." '23 First, although the
18. See, e.g., the suspension power embodied in Ky. Const. § 15, Tex. Const. art.
1, § 28, and N.H. Const. pt. I, § 29.
19. La. Const. of 1812; Hargrave, supra note 7, at 2. Professor Hargrave makes
little reference to the suspension provision of the constitution and fails to make any
specific comments upon the interpretation of the suspension power.
20. La. Const. of 1812, art. IV. Louisiana is the only state with a constitution
containing a limitation of the suspension power which is not contained within a "Bill of
Rights." Until the 1973 Louisiana Constitutional Convention moved the suspension section
into the Legislative Branch article, the provision had always been contained in the General
Provisions article.
21. La. Const. of 1921, art. XIX, § 5 (1962).
22. Johnson v. Duncan & Al.'s Syndics, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 530 (La. 1815).
23. Id. at 530.
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court said the issue was moot, it addressed the validity of whether the
martial law directive suspended civil court proceedings. Analogizing the
suspension provision of the Louisiana Constitution of 1812 to Congress'
exclusive right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus,2 4 Justice Martin
stated: "The proclamation of Martial Law, therefore, if intended to
suspend the functions of this Court or its members, is an attempt to
exercise powers thus exclusively vested in the Legislature." '25
Justice Martin further justified the exclusive authority of the leg-
islature to suspend laws based on the English Parliament's power of
suspension, and the insufficiency of the monarch's authority to do so.
He said the purpose for vesting the suspension power in the legislature
is that:
[in the legislature,] the power is safely lodged without the danger
of its being abused. [The legislature] may repeal the law on
which the safety of the people depends; but it is not their own
caprices and arbitrary humours, but the caprices and arbitrary
humours of the other men which they will have gratified, when
they shall have thus overthrown the columns of public liberty.26
Martin concluded that the declaration of martial law was invalid since
the legislature had not exercised its power, and he further declared that
"the power of repealing a law and that of suspending it (which is a
partial repeal) are Legislative powers."27
In addressing the suspension of court proceedings by the legislature,
the court first established that the suspension power is "a power which
the Legislature cannot exercise without a limitation" 8 and that the limits
are found in the state and federal constitutions. He next analyzed the
issue by suggesting that the legislature's action in closing the courts was
an impairment of the obligation of contracts. Martin first made a
statement of facts concerning the disruption that had occurred by the
British invasion and the call to arms made upon the citizens of Louisiana
to defend the state. In deciding that the suspension had not impaired
the obligation of contracts, Martin declared:
I presume that in any time obnoxious to the due administration
of justice, it is the duty, and within the power, of the Legislature,
to pass laws to avert or diminish the consequences of the general
calamity, and a law called for by such circumstances, and fairly
24. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, ci. 2.
25. Johnson, 3 Mart. (o.s.) at 533.
26. Id. at 535.




intended to meet the exigency of the day could not be properly
classed [as improper].29
Justice Martin limited the exercise of the suspension power to emer-
gency situations and presumably evaluated the "totality of the circum-
stances." This reasoning was further expanded by Justice Derbigny when
he considered the "reasonableness" of the legislative action. He stated
that "if the delay fixed by the Legislature in their discretion was not
unreasonable, they have done nothing more than they had a right to
do, and the law must be obeyed." 30 The "reasonableness" standard was
used 120 years later by the supreme court in determining the legitimacy
of the suspension power during the Great Depression of the 1930s.1 l
After Johnson, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not address the
issue of legislative suspension again until it heard two Depression-era
cases: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Morris3 2 and State ex
rel. Porterie v. Grosjean3  In Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v.
Morris,3 4 the Louisiana Supreme Court validated the legislature's sus-
pension of judicial sales of mortgaged real estate and sales under fore-
closure. The court indicated that this particular exercise of power was
valid since it did not impair the obligation of contracts but did not
explain what limits exist on the power. The court imposed the same
standards of constitutional validity on the legislature for exercise of the
suspension power as it would have for any other legislative act. As long
as the act is not repugnant to the constitution, it is a valid exercise of
the suspension power.
The court's reason for emphasizing the "police power" could be
related to one or both of the issues it addressed, and this creates a
problematic ambiguity. The first issue was the interference with the
obligation to contract and the other was the suspension power. The
court did not clearly separate the two, and it is difficult to determine
to which issue the "police power" is being directed. In its justification
of the legislature's action, the court emphasized the "emergency brought
about by depressed economic and financial conditions"35 of the "De-
pression." The court then went on to illustrate that the legislature had
set out detailed conditions, upon which the court based its finding that
"those conditions [had] brought on a public emergency." '3 6 The court
29. Id. at 545.
30. Id. at 557.
31. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Morris, 181 La. 277, 159 So. 388 (1935); State ex
rel. Porterie v. Grosjean, 182 La. 298, 161 So. 871 (1935).
32. Metropolitan, 181 La. 277, 159 So. 388.
33. Porterie, 182 La. 298, 161 So. 871.
34. Metropolitan, 181 La 277, 159 So. 388.
35. Id. at 288, 159 So. at 392.
36. Id
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was thus satisfied that the legislature had adequately justified its acts.
These statements by the court appear to have been directed at an exercise
of the suspension power, but could as easily have been a valid justi-
fication for the legislature's interference with the obligation to contract.
In finding a valid suspension and thus the creation of an impairment
to obligations to contract, the Louisiana court quoted Chief Justice
Hughes' opinion from Home Building and Loan Association v. Blais-
dell." There, Chief Justice Olsen, in his concurring opinion, stated:
"while emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the
occasion for the exercise of power.""8 The Louisiana Supreme Court
further added that "the legislation was not for the mere advantage of
particular individuals but for the protection of a basic interest of so-
ciety." 3 9
The court's two statements are very interesting because the court
may have been implying a standard for exercise of the suspension power
that requires: 1) an emergency and 2) a protection of a basic interest
of society and not that of particular individuals. If this standard is
being applied to the suspension power and not the police power as a
valid impairment of the obligation to contract, it could be interpreted
as imposing a strict standard for the legitimate exercise of the suspension
power. Consequently, it appears that the court would require that any
use of the suspension power meet both prongs of this two-part test
before it would be justified.
The second of these Depression-era cases was State ex rel. Porterie
v. Grosjean.40 In Grosjean, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that
the delegation of the power to the governor to suspend certain fuel
taxes was valid. The court first looked at whether the delegation was
proper and determined that the constitutional language "by authority
of the legislature ' 41 justified a delegation of the suspension power. The
court also limited the governor's exercise of the delegated suspension
power to situations that were also valid exercises for the legislature
42
and seemed to imply that some limitations must exist. The court em-
phasized the fact that the governor could only exercise the power under
the "conditions, circumstances, and emergencies" specified by the leg-
islature a.4  The court used this statement to justify the governor's sus-
37. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231 (1934).
38. Id. at 426, 54 S. Ct. at 235.
39. Metropolitan, 181 La. at 291, 159 So. at 393 (quoting from Wilson v. New, 243
U.S. 332, 37 S. Ct. 298).
40. State ex rel. Porterie v. Grosjean, 182 La. 298, 161 So. 871 (1935).
41. La. Const. of 1812, art. VI, § 17. This language allowing the legislature to
delegate the suspension power has not been carried over to La. Const. of 1974, art. III,
§ 20.
42. Porterie, 182 La. at 315-17, 161 So. at 876-77.
43. Id. at 307, 161 So. at 874 (emphasis added).
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pension because he did not consider factors outside of those enumerated
by the legislature. This limitation prevented arbitrary discretion by the
governor in using the suspension power. The court's statement may also
imply a duty upon the legislature to enumerate its reasons for exercising
the suspension power when it is used and therefore eliminate any doubt
as to the legislature's intentions. Justice Odom's dissent, in which he
disagreed only with the delegation of the power to the governor, hinted
at the enumeration of reasoning aspect when he conceded that "the
Legislature might authorize the suspension of a law in case a certain
event should take place and authorize its suspension during the existence
of specifically designated conditions or emergencies."" However, Justice
Odom failed to indicate what that "certain event" might be and seemed
reluctant to say that the circumstances of this case were such an event.45
Since these two Depression-era cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court
and lower appellate courts have decided no cases involving the legis-
lature's exercise of the suspension power. This expanse of time leaves
doubt as to how the Louisiana courts will handle the suspension power
when faced with the issue of its validity in the near future. The modern
views regarding the constitutional suspension power were expressed dur-
ing the debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1973.
3. The Constitutional Convention of 1973
In 1973, Louisiana held a constitutional convention which "at-
tempted to bring Louisiana into the mainstream of American state
constitutionalism. '"4 The result of the 1973 convention was the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 and a substantial re-evaluation of the suspension
power embodied in previous constitutions.4 7 The delegates appear to have
been undecided on the exact function of the suspension provision. A
number of delegates expressed reservations as to whether the legislature
needed this power.
An example of the delegates' reservations is illustrated by Delegate
Nunez, who, in analyzing the purpose of the suspension section, asked
the question: "[D]o you really believe this is needed? ' 4 Delegate Casey
44. Id. at 323, 161 So. at 879. (Odom, J., dissenting).
45. The opinion gives no indication of what "conditions and emergencies" would
allow the governor to exercise the delegated suspension power. Justice Odom reasons in
his dissent that the "conditions and emergencies" were not spelled out, and that there
was, therefore, an arbitrary delegation of power. Id.
46. Hargrave, supra note 7, at 1.
47. The convention debate relating to the adoption and amendment of the suspension
power provision covers ten full pages in the Convention Transcripts. 10 Records of the
Louisiana Constiptional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts 452-62, 22nd Days
Proceedings-July 28, 1973 [hereinafter Convention Transcripts-22nd Days].
48. Id. at 461.
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responded: "I would say in nine hundred and ninety-nine thousand times
out of a hundred thousand [sic], you probably don't need this, but
there's that one small, little, minute instance where it would certainly
be helpful to have available." 49 In further support of Delegate Casey's
statement, a number of delegates spoke of the exercise of the suspension
power to rectify mistakes made by the legislature originally in a particular
piece of legislation. ° The reasons delegates forwarded, justifying the use
of the suspension powers, were to address emergency situations, to
address unconstitutional sections of legislation, and to prevent injustices
and other undesirable consequences." The major concerns of the del-
egates involved possible abuses of the power by the legislature through
its exercise of an almost unlimited restraint to pass suspensions when
compared to the passage of bills.
The delegates introduced a number of amendments to the suspension
power clause to limit its use. The first proposal was to limit the power
by making it subject to the gubernatorial veto power. The delegates
specifically introduced this proposal to address the problem of possible
violations of the separation of powers doctrine by use of the suspension
power. When introducing the amendment, Delegate Avant stated: "[The
suspension provision] is a provision that is capable of permitting the
grossest kind of mischief. It is completely inconsistent and at odds with
the theory of checks and balances that is incorporated into the consti-
tution." 2 However, the delegates defeated the amendment. The delegates
specifically rejected the gubernatorial veto in the final version of the
section.
Delegate Perez advanced the second proposal for limiting the sus-
pension power. This proposal addressed the concern that a number of
delegates expressed regarding the unlimited length of time for which a
suspension could be valid.53 The convention eventually adopted the pro-
posal, and it became part of the suspension section; it reads: "[E]very
resolution suspending a law shall fix the period of suspension, which
shall not extend beyond the sixtieth day after final adjournment of the
next regular session. ' 54 The stated purpose of the amendment was to
49. Id.
50. Id. at 460. The delegates talk about a Lead Paint Law that was suspended due
to the inability of the paint industry to comply with absurd provisions for its institution,
a suspension of safety glass standards for the construction industry which could not be
met due to the unavailability of glass meeting the new standards, and a suspension to
correct a failure to grandfather real estate license test applications already accepted under
repealed classroom hour requirements (Extraordinary Session 1972 La. House Concurrent
Resolution No. 24).
51. Id. at 454, 456.
52. Id. at 454.
53. Id. at 455-61.
54. La. Const. art. III, § 20.
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allow the suspension to be valid only long enough to "give the legislature
the opportunity, or a member of the legislature the opportunity at the
next session [after the suspension] to be able to offer a bill which would
either repeal the [problematic] law or amend the law, but would give
the legislature the authority during the interim period, the authority to
suspend." 55
The third proposal for limiting the suspension power addressed
Delegate Arnette's concern over the possibility that the legislature might
pass "secret laws." 5 The delegates adopted a proposal which allows
exercise of the suspension power "only.by the same vote and, except
for ... time limitations for introduction, according to the same pro.
cedures and formalities required for enactment."" The delegates inter-
preted this proposal as the essential equivalent of the reading and
promulgation requirement for a bill that prevents the passage of "secret
legislation." The requirement allows the legislature to debate an issue,
and it also allows the public to know about a legislative proposal and
to express its opinions.
Other portions of the discussion which took place during the con-
stitutional convention addressed the advantages and disadvantages of the
suspension section. Delegate Triche was the most outspoken opponent
of the suspension section. His major concern was that the legislature
had done violence to the original intent inherent in the suspension powers
adopted in 1812. He stated that he believed the original intent was to
limit the government's power and "guarantee ... the people of [Louis-
iana] against rule by executory edict, to prevent the governor from
declaring emergency or martial law, to prevent the executive from sus-
pending laws by executive order and rule by edict, and ... that's all
it meant." 9 He further stated that during special sessions the legislature
had "through the years subverted and misused ' ' 0 the suspension power
to suspend laws that had been erroneously written or were obnoxious
but were not repealable by bill because they were not matters within
the session call. Delegate Triche finished his speech by urging the del-
egates to vote against the section because "[the convention delegates]
55. Comments of Delegate Perez, Convention Transcripts-22nd Days, supra note 47,
at 455.
56. Comments of Delegate Arnette, Convention Transcripts-22nd Days, supra note
47, at 458.
57. La. Const. art. III, § 20.
58. Convention Transcripts-22nd Days, supra note 47, at 458-59.
59. Comments of Delegate Triche, Convention Transcripts-22nd Days, supra note 47,
at 459. This contention is supported by both the origins in the English Bill of Rights
and by the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Duncan & Al.'s Syndics,
3 Mart. (o.s.) 530 (La. 1815) discussed supra at text accompanying notes 25-30.




ought not to allow cursory, ill-thought-up and hasty suspension of
laws." 61
Delegate Drew made one of the strongest arguments in favor of the
adoption of the suspension power. He assured that during his two
sessions in the legislature he had only seen the "power to suspend laws
used to the advantage of the public ... and not to [its) detriment." 62
He related examples of the most recent exercises of the suspension power
such as the lead paint bill mentioned previously.63 In urging the delegates
to adopt the resolution, Delegate Drew stated: "This is something that
serves the benefit of the people. I trust that it will never be abused. I
have not seen it abused to this date .... "64
Although the delegates adopted the suspension section, the lively
debate generated during its introduction gives a good deal of insight
into how the delegates perceived the suspension power. The delegates
had some reservations about the possible abuses of the power and the
utility of the section. They addressed some of these reservations in the
proposed amendments, and the final version reflects the desire to put
limits upon the suspension power. However, the Convention Transcripts
do not reveal exactly the extent and limit of the power and do not
mention the present use of the power as a mechanism to oversee en-
vironmental agency actions.
B. The Statutory Suspension and Nullification Provision
The Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act (LAPA) grants the
legislature the statutory authority to "suspend" or "nullify" state agency
regulations. 65 Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:969 says: "[T]he legislature,
61. Id.




65. La. R.S. 49:968-969 (1987). La. R.S. 49:968 sets up guidelines for review of
agency rules by a legislative committee and allows the committee to suspend or nullify
the rules, subject to a gubernatorial veto. This comment will only address the general
suspension power under LAPA § 969. For a general discussion of the constitutional issues
relating to legislative committee suspension of agency rules, see Arthur E. Bonfield, State
Administrative Rule Making 498-501 (1986). See also, Legislative Research Comm'n v.
Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984) (Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated provision of a
statute authorizing the legislature to suspend an objectionable rule for a period of up to
21 months because the statute: 1) authorized a legislative body to encroach upon the
executive authority, 2) authorized action that was inconsistent with the separation of
powers doctrine, and 3) was an undue delegation of legislative law-making authority to
the committee.); Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 789 (N.H. 1981) (New Hampshire
Court allowed temporary suspension of agency rules by a committee and gubernatorial
review until such a time as the full legislature could properly address the issue by statutory
[Vol. 53
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by concurrent resolution, may nullify or suspend any rule or regulation
or body of rules or regulations adopted by a state department, agency,
board, or commission."" The suspension authorization is a legislative
assertion of the constitutional suspension power. However, the provision
also allows for the nullification or complete repeal of agency regulations.
The nullification power causes the statute to resemble what has been
commonly referred to as a "legislative veto." ' 67 The provision provides
"for review of the exercise of the rulemaking authority delegated by
the legislature to state agencies."" s This relatively new phenomenon is
found in the LAPA and was adopted in 1980.69
The legislative veto concept was first introduced by President Hoover
and adopted by Congress in 1932. Congress provided for 295 veto
provisions in 196 statutes between 1932 and 1975.70 The idea has now
spread to most of the state legislatures. The adoption by the states
corresponds with the introduction of the procedure into the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act promulgated by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1961.71 Although legislative
participation is now part of the agency review process, the states have
adopted veto provisions that allow wide variation in the amount of
legislative participation in the review process. The legislative veto pro-
visions adopted by the states range from the Texas approval resolution,
which has no effect upon the validity of an agency rule, to provisions
similar to Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:969 which allows complete
nullification.
72
In 1982, Professor Force noted that the legislative veto and oversight
sections of the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act were patterned
after sections 3-202 to 3-204 of the Model State Administrative Procedure
Act and described them as "represent[ing] an important new development
means). La. Const. art. IlI, § 10(A) requires a quorum for the legislature to "transact
business," and could be used to invalidate La. R.S. 49:968 on grounds similar to Opinion
of the Justices and Brown.
66. La. R.S. 49:969 (1987) (emphasis added).
67. Robert Force & Lawrence Griffith, The Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act,
42 La. L. Rev. 1227, 1289 (1982). A "legislative veto" is the ability of the legislature
to veto agency regulations in a manner similar to a gubernatorial veto such that the
regulation/rule does not go into effect if rejected.
68. La. R.S. 49:969 (1987).
69. 1980 La. Acts No. 660, § I.
70. Richard L. Slater, Note, Oklahoma's Legislative Veto: Combat Casualty in Sep-
aration of Powers War?, 12 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 129, 147 (1987).
71. Id. at 147-48.
72. R. Bradley Lambert, Comment, The Legislative Veto: A Survey, Constitutional
Analysis, and Empirical Study of its Effect in Michigan, 29 Wayne L. Rev. 91, 92-93
(1982).
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in state administrative procedure."" He further indicated that the "full
range" of legal issues relating to the legislative veto had not been
completely addressed but was a concern of the National Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws in the re-drafting of the Model
State Administrative Procedure Act in 1981.14 Sections 3-202 to 3-204
of the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act were the result
of a compromise between the proponents and opponents of the legislative
veto."
The Louisiana Legislature incorporated the legislative veto provision
in 1980.76 The legislature may have indicated a desire to bring the
Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act into alignment with the 1981
draft of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act, but this also
corresponds historically with the passage of the Louisiana Environmental
Procedure Act in the previous legislative session." The timing of the
passage of both pieces of legislation may be coincidental, but could be
a significant factor in looking at the events surrounding the passage of
the legislative veto in Louisiana and could indicate a desire on the
legislature's part to use Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:969 as a limit
upon the expansion of the newly created environmental agencies. This
desire to limit the power of environmental agencies may also have been
prevalent when the legislature attempted to suspend the law creating the
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality in 1983.7
The Louisiana courts have yet to directly address the legislative veto.
State v. Broom 79 is the only case that has mentioned the legislative veto
section of the LAPA. The case made a cursory appraisal of the section
as a possible check upon arbitrary agency action but failed to mention
any limits or to rule on the provision's validity.8 The court merely
assumed the validity of the provision. However, since 1982, the United
States Supreme Court and other states' courts have addressed issues
raised by the legislative veto.$'
II. ISSUES RmSED BY THE SUSPENSION POWER
The legislature is empowered with some form of suspension power;
however, the exercise of the power raises concerns regarding the limits
73. Force & Griffith, supra note 67, at 1289.
74. Id.
75. Bonfield, supra note 65, at 498-501.
76. 1980 La. Acts No. 660, § 1.
77. 1979 La. Acts No. 449, § 1.
78. 1983 La. Extraordinary Session Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 3 (suspending
1983 La. Acts No. 97). See infra text accompanying notes 107-111 for a further discussion
of this legislative action.
79. State v. Broom, 439 So. 2d 357, on rehearing 439 So. 2d 365 (La. 1983).
80. Id.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 112-123 for discussion of these cases.
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on and validity of the power when it is exercised to suspend environ-
mental laws and agency regulations. The major issue raised by the
suspension of environmental laws and agency regulations is whether such
action amounts to a violation of the "separation of powers" doctrine.
s2
Another related issue is raised by the interaction of the delegation of
powers by the legislature to state agencies with the suspension and
legislative veto procedures. Finally, when dealing with environmental
laws and regulations, the exercise of the suspension power may clash
with Louisiana Constitution article IX, section 1 and its mandate to
protect the environment. 3
A. Separation of Powers Doctrine
1. Louisiana and the Separation of Powers Doctrine
Louisiana Constitution Article II embodies the doctrine of separation
of powers and explicitly states the concept that the functions of gov-
ernment should be exercised by three co-equal but separate branches of
government. Article II, section 1 states: "[T]he powers of government
of the state are divided into three separate branches: legislative, executive,
and judicial."8 This section is followed by the limitations upon the
branches: "Except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, no one
of these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall
exercise power belonging to either of the others." 5
The drafters of the Kentucky Constitution developed its articles from
the separation of powers language Thomas Jefferson originally wrote. 8
The Louisiana delegates copied the Kentucky language into the 1812
Louisiana Constitution. Article III, section 1 of the 1974 Louisiana
Constitution indicates that "[t]he legislative power of the state is vested
in a legislature." Article IV, section 5 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution
indicates that "[t]he governor shall be the chief executive officer of the
state ... and see that the laws are faithfully executed." Recently,
82. The separation of powers doctrine is embodied in La. Const. art. II, §§ 1 and
2. La. Const. art II, § 1 reads: "The powers of government of the state are divided into
three separate branches: legislative, executive, and judicial." La. Const. art II, § 2 reads:
"Except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, no one of these branches, nor any
person holding office in one of them, shall exercise power belonging to either of the
others."
83. See infra text accompanying notes 140-144 for a discussion of Save Ourselves,
Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (1984) (recognizing that La. Const.
art. IX, § I establishes environmental protection as a goal of the State of Louisiana).
84. La. Const. art. II, § 1.
85. La. Const. art. II, § 2.
86. State v. Allen, 169 La. 1046, 1057, 126 So. 548, 552 (1930).
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Louisiana courts have tended to move away from a strict interpretation
of the separation of powers doctrine.1
7
In 1930, the Louisiana Supreme Court clearly established the basic
premises of Louisiana's separation of powers doctrine in Saint v. Allen."s
In Saint, the court looked to the origin of Article II, Sections 1 and
2, of the Kentucky Constitution of 1797 and considered the fact that
Thomas Jefferson was the author. The court held that members of the
legislature could not be employed in the executive branch because that
would violate the separation of powers doctrine in the Louisiana con-
stitution. In making this decision, the court looked to Jefferson, Ma-
dison, and Hamilton as the strongest supporters of the separation of
powers doctrine implicit in the United States Constitution and also to
Montesquieu's works. 9
The court established a strict separation of the branches because
the separation of powers doctrine is founded on the ideas that: 1) one
branch of government, while exercising its legitimate powers, should not
be able to exert overwhelming influence directly or indirectly upon
another branch; 2) each branch should have a will of its own; and 3)
placing all the power in one branch (executive or legislative) creates the
potential for arbitrary exercise of power and unchecked authority9 The
court wished to create "no [chance] for usurpation; for, though this,
in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary
weapon by which free governments are destroyed." 9' The court concluded
that the ideals of the separation of powers doctrine are essential to a
republican form of government, and "[t]o preserve liberty to the people,
there must be restraints and balances and separations of power." 92 The
separation of powers doctrine that the court set out in Saint has been
the basis for the Louisiana courts' decisions involving allegations that
one branch has overstepped its constitutional boundaries of power.93
The Louisiana separation of powers case most analogous to the
present exercise of the suspension power by the legislature is Henry v.
87. Hargrave, supra note 7, at 43.
88. Saint v. Allen, 169 La. 1046, 126 So. 548 (1930).
89. Id. at 1053-54, 126 So. at 551.
90. Id. at 1053-62, 126 So. at 551-53.
91. Id. at 1064, 126 So. at 554 (quoting from George Washington's Farewell Address).
92. Id. at 1061, 126 So. at 553.
93. See generally State Bd. of Ethics for Elected Officials v. Green, 545 So. 2d 1031
(La. 1989), on rehearing 566 So. 2d 623 (La. 1990); Bruneau v. Edwards, 517 So. 2d
818 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987); Board of Comm'ns of Orleans Levee District, 496 So. 2d
281 (La. 1986); Rapides Gen. Hosp. v. Robinson, 488 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1986); State ex rel. Guste v. Legislative Budget Comm., 347 So. 2d 160 (La. 1977); Henry
v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153 (La. 1977); Carso v. Board of Liquidation of State Debt,
205 La. 368, 17 So. 2d 358 (1944).
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Edwards.94 In Henry, the legislature had placed a general law in an
appropriations item so that it looked like a limit upon the appropriation.
This action forced the governor either to veto a needed appropriation
or to accept what he believed to be an unwise and unacceptable piece
of legislation. The court found a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine under the premise that the legislature attempted to circumvent
the governor's constitutional veto power. 95 The court described the leg-
islature's technique as "artfully drafting general law measures'' 96 to
"impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal
branch of government.' '97 The reasoning of the Louisiana court finds
federal support in Consumer Energy v. F.E.R.C.,9s where the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated Congress' legislative veto provision
in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. The court stated that the purpose
of the federal presentment clause" was to prevent Congress from "sub-
verting the presentation requirement by restyling the nature of the ac-
tion." 00
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently reevaluated the separation
of powers doctrine in State Board of Ethics for Elected Officials v.
Green.'0 1 Green raised the issue of whether the legislature's appointment
of members to the ethics commission was a usurpation of the governor's
appointment power and whether such a board could institute civil en-
forcement actions. On original hearing, the court found the legislature
could appoint members to a committee without violating the governor's
appointment power and did not change this decision upon rehearing.
The issue of whether a legislatively appointed board or commission could
institute civil enforcement powers (traditionally an executive function),
however, split the court in a 4-3 vote and caused a change in the
outcome of the case on rehearing. On original hearing, the court issued
an opinion which strictly separated legislative and executive functions
and ruled that the committee could not institute a civil enforcement
action because it had "the authority to exercise the exclusive executive
function of enforcing the law by filing suit against alleged violators of
the law." 10 2
94. Henry v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153 (La. 1977).
95. La. Const. art. III, §§ 15, 17, 18. These sections of the Louisiana Constitution
deal with the gubernatorial veto power and the legislative override authority.
96. Henry, 346 So. 2d at 158.
97. Id.
98. 673 F. 2d 425 (6th Cir. 1982).
99. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 7, cl. 3.
100. Consumer Energy, 673 F. 2d at 452.
101. 545 So. 2d 1031 (1989), on rehearing, 566 So. 2d 623 (La. 1990) (severely criticized
in Elizabeth V. Baker, Note, Usurping the Executive Power: State Board of Ethics for
Elected Officials v. Green, 51 La. L. Rev. 911 (1991)).
102. Green, 545 So. 2d at 1037 (original hearing).
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In a 4-3 decision on rehearing, the court found the committee could
institute the enforcement action. (The rehearing was held after Justice
Hall joined the court.) Justice Lemmon, writing for the majority, held:
The mere fact that the Legislature has appointed [an agency's]
members does not violate separation of power principles, as long
as (1) the appointment of the members by the Legislature was
constitutionally valid and (2) the appointees are not subject to
such significant legislative control that the Legislature can be
deemed to be performing executive functions through its control
of the members [of an agency] in the executive branch. 03
The court indicated that it would determine whether the legislature had
usurped the executive function by focusing "on the degree of control
[by the legislature] over the [agency] appointees contained in the par-
ticular statutory scheme under review.' " °4 The court further stated that
it is not the exercise of an executive power that violates the separation
of powers article, but whether the usurpation "significantly unbalance[s]
the equilibrium sought to be established by the constitutional allocation
of powers among the various branches of government." 0 3 The decision
is a clear indication that the Louisiana Supreme Court is blurring the
bright line separations between the executive and legislative branches set
forth in Saint'06 and is allowing functions of the legislative branch to
overlap into the executive branch. The court will no longer look only
at whether a member of an executive branch is also a member of the
legislative branch, but will also look at the amount of "control" one
branch has over the other. However, the split decision and the change
upon rehearing indicates that the court could easily shift back to the
stricter standard pronounced in the original hearing.
The only documented direct confrontation between the executive
branch and the legislative branch over a suspension involved the sus-
pension of the act creating the Louisiana Department of Environmental
Quality (DEQ).' 0 During the 1983 special session, the legislature, as a
measure to save money in the state's budget, passed a concurrent res-
olution to suspend the act creating the DEQ.' 8 In response to the
legislature's action, Governor Treen promulgated an executive order
declaring the resolution invalid and unconstitutional.'19 The order then
103. Green, 566 So. 2d at 624 (on rehearing).
104. Id. at 625.
105. Id. at 626.
106. Saint v. Allen, 169 La. 1046, 126 So. 548 (1930).
107. 1983 La. Extraordinary Session Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 3 (suspending
1983 La. Acts No. 97).
108. Id.
109. 1983 Executive Order No. 83-30.
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directed the execution of the act creating the DEQ. The governor based
his order on the premise that the resolution violated the separation of
powers doctrine, and he specifically quoted the "artfully drafted" test
in Henry v. Edwards." 0 However, a confrontation in the courtroom
never materialized-the legislature backed down and repealed the sus-
pension. " '
2. Separation of Powers in Federal Law and Other States
The separation of powers doctrine has played an important role in
addressing the issue of the legislative veto at both the federal and state
levels. The legislative veto/statutory suspension power was first chal-
lenged in state courts and then later in the federal courts. Most of the
cases invalidating the legislative veto provisions were based on the sep-
aration of powers issue.
The most significant case in which a court held the legislative veto
to be repugnant to the separation of powers doctrine was the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice v. Chadha." 2 The Court found that the one-house legislative veto
contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act violated the bica-
meralism requirement" 3 and the presentment clause."14 Quoting Madison,
Hamilton, and its own separation of powers cases, the Court reasoned
that the legislative veto upset the system of "checks and balances" in
the constitution. Quoting Alexander Hamilton, the Court indicated that
"[tihe primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon
the Executive is, to enable him to defend himself; the second one is to
increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of
bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design.""' The Chadha de-
cision validated similar reasoning in Consumer Energy v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission" 6 when the Sixth Circuit held that a one-house
110. Id. at § 7(f) (quoting from Henry v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153 (La. 1977)).
111. 1984 La. Acts No. 342, §§ 1-2.
112. 462 U.S. 919, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). The Louisiana Supreme Court originally
heard State v. Broom, 439 So. 2d 357 (La. 1983) (discussed supra at text accompanying
note 81) before Chadha was decided. The rehearing was granted and mentioned the
legislative veto provision (La. R.S. 49:969 (1987)), but it appears the Louisiana court may
have been confused about Chadha's impact. The court made a cursory mention of the
bicameralism issue and completely ignored the presentment clause issue upon which the
U.S. Supreme Court based most of its opinion. The Louisiana court ultimately identified
the legislative veto as a check on the delegation of legislative power but gave no hint as
to its limits or validity. Broom, 439 So. 2d at 367-68.
113. U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 7.
114. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
115. Chadha, 462 U.S at 943, 103 S. Ct. at 2782 (quoting A. Hamilton, The Federalist
No. 73, at 458 (H. Lodge ed. 1888)).
116. 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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legislative veto was a violation of the separation of powers doctrine and
the presentment clause.
A number of state courts have held the legislative veto invalid under
their own state separation of powers provisions. Only Michigan, South
Dakota, Iowa, and Connecticut courts have held legislative vetoes valid.
These states are the only ones that have constitutional provisions that
expressly authorize legislative overview of agency rules by either legis-
lative committee or joint resolution. In the absence of a provision
expressly authorizing statutory legislative vetoes, the veto is impermissible
under most state constitutions.
17
The state courts have given a variety of reasons for subscribing to
the theory that the legislative veto violates separation of powers prin-
ciples. The Kentucky Supreme Court held a provision authorizing a joint
legislative committee to delay operation of any rule for up to 21 months
was an encroachment upon executive authority, it authorized action that
was inconsistent with the separation of powers principle, and was an
undue delegation of legislative law-making authority to a committee."'
The Kansas court held that "broad and absolute legislative veto" of
state agency rules violated separation of powers doctrine by excessive
interference with the executive function and by allowing the legislature
to amend and repeal existing laws without gubernatorial participation." 9
In New Jersey, the legislative veto could not pass constitutional muster
when "substantial potential to interfere with exclusive executive functions
or alter the statute's purposes" exists. 20 The West Virginia Supreme
Court invalidated the legislative veto when the legislature purported to
take action with the effect of law by nonstatutory means, acted as an
administrative agency, and usurped exclusive power of the executive
branch.' 2 ' In a pre-Chadha case, the New Hampshire court did not
completely invalidate the legislative veto. It held that committees of the
legislature, the senate president, or the speaker of the house could not
permanently veto an agency rule, but that the legislature could provide
a mechanism to suspend rules between sessions to assure a reasonable
opportunity to veto by statutory means. 22 Alaska was one of the first
states to invalidate legislative suspension of agency rules when the Alaska
Supreme Court held the action was a violation of separation of powers
because reserving exclusive executive action in the legislature and thus,
117. Bonfield, supra note 65, at 497-501.
118. Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W. 2d 907 (Ky. 1984). No mention
was made in the opinion regarding the suspension provision of the Kentucky Constitution.
119. State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622 (Kan.
1984).
120. Enourato v. New Jersey Bldg. Auth., 448 A.2d 449 (N.J. 1982).
121. State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E. 2d 622 (W. Va. 1981).
122. Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 789 (N.H. 1981).
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circumvented the gubernatorial veto power by non-statutory means. 23
These cases indicate that the legislative veto has not been viewed fa-
vorably at the state level.
B. Delegation of Powers
The environmental agency rulemaking procedure is essentially a leg-
islative function that the legislature has delegated to an executive agency.
Consequently, the legislature may wish to justify its usurpation of the
executive branch's power, when the legislature reserves oversight power,
as an exchange for its delegation of powers to the executive. The
legislature will call the suspension power a control or limit upon the
legislative power delegated to the executive branch. The question is
whether this control is legitimate in light of the present safeguards the
courts already erect for the legislature when evaluating the delegation
of rulemaking authority or whether the legislature should have an ad-
ditional check upon the delegation.
In State v. Union Tank Car Company, 2 4 the Louisiana Supreme
Court indicated that while the "legislature may not delegate the legislative
power to determine what the law shall be, it may delegate to admin-
istrative boards and agencies of the state power to ascertain and de-
termine the facts upon which the laws are to be applied and enforced."' 25
This limit upon what the legislature can delegate to administrative agen-
cies is based on the premise that for the delegation to be proper, it
should embody some basic legislative policy decision within which the
agency may make decisions, and it is this policy that is the law.'
2 6
To assure that the legislature establishes "standards for guidance"
for the executive, administrative body, or officer of such to prevent
"unfettered discretion" and "arbitrary actions" in wielding the delegated
power, 27 the Louisiana Supreme Court has developed the three-prong
Schwegmann Brothers test to determine the constitutionality of a leg-
islative delegation of power to an administrative branch. 28 A Louisiana
court should only uphold a legislative delegation when: (1) "the statute
expresses a clear legislative policy;" (2) "[the statute] contains guidance
for administrative officials in executing the law;" and (3) "the standards
123. State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980).
124. 439 So. 2d 377 (La. 1983).
125. Id. at 380.
126. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts. v. McCrory, 237 La. 768, 112 So. 2d 606
(1959).
127. State v. Broom, 439 So. 2d 357 (La. 1983). See also, Commissioner of Agri. v.
Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council, 439 So. 2d 348 (La. 1983) and State v. Barthelemy,
545 So. 2d 531 (La. 1989).
128. Barthelemy, 545 So. 2d at 534 (reiterating delegation test from Schwegmann, 237
La. 768. 112 So. 2d 606).
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do not permit arbitrary action by the administrative agency."' 2 9 This
test gives both the legislature and the courts a method by which to
control the delegation of power. If the legislature adheres to this stan-
dard, it has no need to provide for further safeguards to prevent itself
from delegating the legislative function, and to do so would allow it
to encroach into the realm of the executive. However, the court has
applied the test less stringently when dealing with matters of environ-
mental policy.
In State v. Union Tank Car Company,30 the Louisiana Supreme
Court allowed a less stringent standard "[b]ecause statutes directed at
control of air pollution are intended to encompass infinitely variable
environmental conditions" and "flexibility and adaptability are required
in meeting factual situations which could not possibly be foreseen by
the legislature."'' Based on this unique nature of environmental law,
the court, while evaluating the state air control law in Union Tank Car,
explained: "[S]tatutes in the area of environmental law need not address
each and every factual situation in which air pollution might be involved;
instead it is sufficient if [such] statutes be general in nature but at the
same time retain standards of sufficient clarity to put [the] violator on
notice."' 132 The court went on to stipulate that even broad environmental
standards are adequate to support constitutional delegation of authority
if the standards can be inferred from the legislative policy of the statutory
scheme. 3 3 The court emphasized the first Schwegmann factor, requiring
a clear legislative policy set forth in the legislature, over that of setting
express standards for agency guidance. The court in this instance was
relying more on the idea that the legislative policy is the law, and the
agency cannot go beyond that policy without stepping outside of the
constitutional limits of the power transferred to it.
C. Constitutional Environmental Mandate
In dealing with matters of environmental concern, the Louisiana
Constitution requires the legislature to be more careful in making its
decisions. The Louisiana Constitution article IX, section 1 "public trust
doctrine" is a "non-binding mandate [for] the legislature to protect the
environment." 14 The provision reads:
The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and
the healthful, scenic, historic, and aesthetic quality of the en-
129. Id.
130. 439 So. 2d 377 (La. 1983).
131. Id. at 382.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 380-82.
134. Hargrave, supra note 7, at 156.
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vironment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar
as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare
of the people. The legislature shall enact laws to implement this
policy.'"
The drafters intended the provision to be a statement of policy and not
"bind" the legislature such that they are forced to pass legislation to
protect environmental concerns. 3 6 The drafters indicated that the "shall
enact laws" language means "that if the legislature in its wisdom should
decide that they want to beef up this provision," they may do it.'3
However, the courts have not ignored the provision and have made it
stronger than the drafters intended. They are interpreting "shall" as a
strong suggestion to the legislature to implement the policy. The courts'
interpretation is more in line with the committee reports and discussions
that view the provision as an environmental "bill of rights,"'3 a view
which the drafters appeared to have rejected in their floor debates. 3 9
Even ignoring the stronger view, the courts should harmonize the en-
vironmental mandate and suspension powers provisions of the consti-
tution to follow the jurisprudential interpretation of the "public trust
doctrine."
In Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Com-
mission,'14 the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that Louisiana Con-
stitution article IX, section 1 establishes environmental protection as a
goal of the State of Louisiana. Justice Dennis seemed to suggest that
article IX, section 1 should be considered by the legislature when it is
enacting statutes that have an affect upon the environment. 14' The same
principle should apply to a repeal or suspension of an environmental
law or regulation. The constitutional standard is that the legislature
should promote environmental protection "insofar as possible and con-
sistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people."' 42 Justice
Dennis stated this rule as a
135. La. Const. art. IX, § 1.
136. Hargrave, supra note 7, at 156. Professor Hargrave notes that "[a]ttempts to
adopt a stronger provision first in the Committee on Natural Resources and the Envi-
ronment and then on the convention floor were defeated." Id.
137. Comments of Delegate Lambert, 10 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional
Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts 2911, 103rd Days Proceedings-December 18,
1973 [hereinafter Convention Transcripts-I03rd Days].
138. See generally 13 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973:
Committee Documents 572-74, 602-03.
139. See generally discussion in Hargrave, supra note 7, at 156 and the floor debates
in Convention Transcripts-I03rd Days, supra note 137, at 2911-13.
140. 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
141. Id.
142. La. Const. art. IX, § 1.
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rule of reasonableness which requires an agency or official,
before granting approval of proposed action affecting the en-
vironment, to determine that adverse environmental impacts have
been minimized or avoided as much as possible consistently with
the public welfare. Thus, the constitution does not establish
environmental prctection as an exclusive goal, but requires a
balancing process in which environmental costs and benefits must
be given full and careful consideration along with economic,
social and other factors.'
4 3
The standard should apply equally to any act of the legislature and
possibly more stringently to environmental acts since the constitution
says "[tihe legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy."
' 1
4
In American Waste and Pollution Control Company v. State, 4 the
Louisiana Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the "public trust" mandate
of Louisiana Constitution article IX, section 1 as stated in Save Our-
selves. The court stated that the policy was a reiteration of the "public
trust doctrine" as stated in Louisiana Constitution of 1921 article VI,
section 1 but was the first time the legislature was "mandated ... to
enact laws to implement [the] policy."'4 Although deciding whether
appeals of environmental permit denials by the Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality were subject to a de novo review in a state district
court, the court, looking toward legislative history, indicated that the
laws creating DEQ and setting up the regulation and control of waste
disposal and water pollution were a direct result of the legislature's
implementation of the constitutional "public trust doctrine."'' 47 Although
reversed on the substantive issue, the supreme court's language relating
to the "public trust" doctrine affirmed similar language stated in the
first circuit court of appeal's opinion in the same case.1
Since the legislature is designated the guardian of this "public trust"
policy by the constitutional provision, the legislature could be evaluated
under a strict scrutiny test when it acts to repeal, nullify, or suspend
environmental laws and regulations rather than by Justice Dennis' rea-
sonableness test used to evaluate the initial passage of environmental
laws and regulations. If the constitutional policy has been implemented
in accordance with the constitutional mandate, it should be harder for
the legislature to reverse its course than it was to initiate it. A pre-
143. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1157 (emphasis added).
144. La. Const. art. IX, § I (emphasis added).
145. In re American Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. State, 588 So. 2d 367 (La.
1991).
146. American Waste, 588 So. 2d at 372 (emphasis added).
147. Id.
148. In re American Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. State, 580 So. 2d 392 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1991).
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sumption should exist that the initial passage was in the interest of the
"public trust" and that the repeal runs counter to that provision. This
would prevent the legislature from whimsically changing its mind and
remedy the potential conflict between two constitutional provisions. The
court should use the strict scrutiny standard expressed in Hondroulis v.
Schuhmacher 149 when the legislature uses the suspension power to address
environmental issues. Thus, the legislature's action could be "justified
only by compelling state interests, and ... drawn to express only those
interests."'" Additionally, the legislature would not enjoy the benefit
of the usual presumption of the constitutionality of its acts, and the
burden of proof would be upon the legislature to show that the sus-
pension power is necessarily related to a compelling state interest more
important than the constitutional mandate."'
111. ANALzYSIS
As the Louisiana Legislature continues to use its suspension power
over environmental laws and regulations, the likelihood that the Louis-
iana courts will be faced with a confrontation between the executive
and legislative branches increases. The courts must be prepared to define
the limits of the suspension power in this context. Louisiana courts have
not yet had to address this issue. How should they proceed to tackle
the problem?
A. Separation of Powers
In evaluating the problems of both the constitutional and statutory
suspension powers, the courts must first inquire into the general aspects
of the "separation of powers" doctrine. It is obvious that the exercise
of the suspension power impinges to some extent upon the executive
branch. The improper use of the power to suspend the operation of
laws can be very dangerous if used improperly.
The evaluation the courts should use is that enunciated in State
Board of Ethics for Elected Officials v. Green.5" The court should look
to "the degree of control""' the legislature is exercising over the ex-
ecutive agency by suspending its rules or statutory authority. The leg-
islature should be limited when the suspension power significantly upsets
the equilibrium established between the branches by the separation of
powers doctrine. However, the supreme court's vacillation in Green is
149. 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1988).
150. Id. at 415.
151. Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985).
152. 545 So. 2d 1031 (La. 1989). on rehearing 566 So. 2d 623 (La. 1990).
153. Id. at 625.
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a good indication that the "separation of powers" doctrine is not well
settled in Louisiana. Thus, the stricter standard enunciated in Saint v.
Allen14 and on original hearing in Green may dictate a very limited
usurpation of one branch of government's power by the other, and
allow no degree of legislative control over executive agencies. The stan-
dard used will make a difference in a decision upon the validity of the
suspension power. Either standard requires severe limits upon the sus-
pension power. If no strong limitations exist, the legislature's unfettered
discretion could lead to abuses of the suspension power, and the sus-
pension power could severely disturb the balance that the constitution
has established between the legislative and executive branches.
One way of determining whether the equilibrium has been upset
and where to set limits is to examine the purposes for which the
legislature has exercised the suspension power. The courts could easily
be confronted with a situation similar to that in Henry v. Edwards.55
As in Henry, the legislature could use the suspension power to circumvent
the gubernatorial veto power. Circumvention of the veto power is one
of the most basic violations of the separation of powers doctrine. The
legislature could attempt to "artfully" draft a concurrent resolution to
do something they could not otherwise do. Although the action is a
temporary measure when enacted under the guise of the suspension
power, the legislature can use it from session-to-session to perpetuate
the harm to the executive branch and the "public trust." The exercise
of the suspension power in this manner essentially takes the executive
branch out of the system of checks and balances inherent in the con-
stitution and upsets the delicate balance established by the constitutional
drafters. Not only is the executive branch unable to protect itself, but
it is no longer able to protect the interests of the citizens.
Another reason the legislature could suspend or nullify environmental
agency regulations or suspend environmental laws empowering agencies
to act is to accommodate the needs of special interest groups. Special
interest groups actually played a large role in the 1991 legislature's
suspension of the teacher evaluation system.15 6 If the legislature flounders
under the pressure of these special interest groups, it is violating the
154. 169 La. 1046, 126 So. 548 (1930).
155. 346 So. 2d 153 (La. 1977).
156. 1991 La. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 66. Teacher's unions and interest
groups played a large part in pressuring the legislature to suspend Louisiana's teacher
evaluation and re-certification program. By suspending the program, the legislature elim-
inated any chance of Governor Roemer vetoing a repeal of a program that he had
campaigned hard to establish as part of the Children's First Act. Consequently, the
governor had little input into the matter. The legislature also avoided the public out-cry




public trust by allowing the groups to circumvent the regular agency
rulemaking process. Unchecked legislative suspension or nullification of
agency regulations leaves the door open for special interest groups to
pressure the legislature into suspending the rules when the groups are
unsuccessful in challenging the agency action via the LAPA. 5 7 Conse-
quently, if a group has the ear of the correct number of legislators, it
can ignore the legitimate statutory means the legislature has set up for
reviewing agency actions, avoid the time and expense that is required
under the presently established standards, and eliminate the power of
the executive branch altogether. Taking the executive out of the legislative
process prevents the executive from establishing what Hamilton called
"a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the
community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse
unfriendly to the public good which may happen to influence a majority
of [the legislature]. "18 Further, the executive check "increase[s] the
chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws
through haste, inadvertence, or design."15 9 The influences that special
interest groups exert are at least as important today as they were in
Hamilton's time.
The legislature may justify its actions by asserting that the suspension
power is a method for limiting the power of the governor to veto
legislative action at his fancy, and that all parties concerned have a
better chance to review the suspended law. The argument may have
some weight when considered in light of the fact that the 1991 legis-
lature's passage of Louisiana's new abortion law' 60 was the legislature's
first override of a gubernatorial veto since the adoption of the 1921
Constitution. However, the court in Carso v. Board of Liquidation
161
rejected this argument as a valid justification of legislative action when
it stated: "[L]et there be no change by usurpation; for, though this, in
one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon
by which free governments are destroyed."' 62 The court further em-
phasized that "[tihe precedent must always greatly overbalance in per-
manent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use may at any
time yield" and further emphasized that a change which affects the
constitutionally established balance of power should be accomplished by
157. La. R.S. 49:951-70 (1987 and Supp. 1991). The Louisiana Administrative Procedure
Act provides interested parties a number of opportunities to challenge agency rules and
regulations through statutory procedures and review processes.
158. Consumer Energy v. F.E.R.C, 673 F. 2d 425, 462 (6th Cir. 1982) (quoting A.
Hamilton, The Federalist No. 73) (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. 1991 La. Acts No. 26.
161. 205 La. 368, 17 So. 2d 358 (1944).
162. Id. at 383, 17 So. at 364.
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constitutional amendment. 63 Therefore, the use of the suspension power
in cases other than emergency situations should not survive under a
justification that it offsets the traditionally strong power the guberna-
torial veto has had in Louisiana. Only when an emergency situation
exists or when the constitution clearly shows intent to the contrary does
the need for suspension and immediate action "overbalance" the re-
quirement that the governor review legislative actions as part of the
system of checks and balances established by the constitution.
The legislature's perceived inability traditionally to override the
gubernatorial veto does not justify usurping that power but for some
very good reason, i.e. "a compelling state interest." Otherwise, the false
perception that too much power has been concentrated in the executive
branch will lead to an actual shift in the concentration of power to the
legislature. Power concentration in one branch creates what James Ma-
dison called the "very definition of tyranny."' 64 Tyranny and abuse of
power are what the drafters intended to avoid when they adopted the
separation of powers doctrine, the gubernatorial veto, and the suspension
power.
B. Delegation of Powers
The legislature could defend its suspension power under the dele-
gation of powers theory. It can be stated that the legislature is delegating
the rulemaking function to the executive branch, and should get some-
thing in return to protect itself. This argument is weakened by the strict
scrutiny the Louisiana courts have given the legislature's delegation of
legislative functions to administrative agencies. The Schwegmann three-
prong test is a prime example of the protection the legislature is already
afforded against the executive branch. The judicial scrutiny of the del-
egation serves two purposes. First, the judiciary keeps the legislature
from giving away too many of its legislative functions. Second, it pre-
vents the legislature from inventing its own vague methods of admin-
istrative overview, such as exercising the suspension or legislative veto
power, which may intrude upon the functions of the executive branch.
Consequently, a neutral body evaluates the reasonableness of the leg-
islature's decision to delegate rather than the legislature itself.
Courts must consider the legislature's delegation of power to en-
vironmental agencies in light of State v. Union Tank Car Company.165
Union Tank Car allows for a less strict standard of evaluation than
Schwegmann since the complexity of some environmental issues may
163. Id.
164. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443, 85 S. Ct. 1707, 1712 (1965) (quoting
James Madison).
165. 439 So. 2d 377 (La. 1983).
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require the legislature to give environmental agencies more leeway than
other administrative agencies. Consequently, Louisiana courts may allow
more lax standards upon the limits of the exercise of the suspension
powers over administrative agencies as a check upon the broader powers
given to environmental agencies.
C. The Legislative Veto
The LAPA gives the legislature the power to suspend or nullify an
agency regulation.'" This provision is a legislative veto. Similar provisions
have been declared invalid by the United States Supreme Court and
various states. 167 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 
16
the Court struck down the legislative veto provision as a violation of
the "presentment" clause of the United States Constitution. 69 A number
of state courts have invalidated the legislative veto for similar reasons,
or because it violated the separation of powers doctrine. 70 The only
states which have held the legislative veto valid are those with consti-
tutional provisions specifically allowing the legislature to exercise a leg-
islative veto.
171
In Louisiana, the nullification of agency regulations by the legislature
would be a direct violation of the constitution's "presentment"
provisions7 2 because it would be a permanent repeal of the agency
regulation. This would be the equivalent of a partial repeal of the law
giving the agency authority to make the regulations. Consequently, a
repeal of a law requires the approval of the governor under the pre-
sentment provision of the Louisiana constitution. 7
The validity of the suspension of agency regulations under the LAPA
legislative veto provision depends upon the validity of the constitutional
suspension power. The provision is a legislative restatement of the con-
stitutional provision as applied to agency regulations. Consequently, the
166. La. R.S. 49:969 (1987).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 112-123.
168. 462 U.S. 919, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
169. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 118-123.
171. See supra text accompanying note 117.
172. La. Const. art. III, §§ 17, 18.
173. Since the writing of this paper, the 1992 Legislative Session used the nullification
power under the LAPA to nullify rules adopted by the Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries
Commission prohibiting commercial fishermen from taking spotted sea trout (speckled
trout) on weekends. See 1992 La. House Concurrent Resolution No. 211. The provision
is specifically worded as a "nullification" of the rules and not a suspension. This type
of nullification is a direct violation of the "presentment" provisions of the Louisiana
Constitution under the "separation of powers" argument and its relationship to the
legislative veto under the reasoning of Chadha and its prodgeny.
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limits on the statutory suspension power are the same as the limits on
the constitutional provision.
It can be argued that the constitutional provision does not apply
to agency regulations since they are not "laws" as contemplated by the
Louisiana constitution. The legislature is empowered only to "suspend
a law.' ' 74 The reference to "law" may limit the power to acts of the
legislature and not those of other governmental bodies. In Board of
Elementary and Secondary Education v. Nix,"S the Louisiana Supreme
Court made clear that references to "law" in the state constitution were
to be interpreted as meaning "statute." To devine "by law," the court
looked to the 1973 Constitutional Convention debates and ascertained
that the drafters had explained in a style and drafting report that the
terms "by law" and "by statute" were equivalent. Justice Tate further
defined law as "the solemn expression of legislative will.' ' 76 Based on
this reasoning, agency regulations are not "law" and thus not subject
to the constitutional suspension power. Therefore, the suspension under
the LAPA becomes a partial repeal and invalid for the same reasons
as a nullification of an agency regulation.
A further reason for not applying the suspension power to agency
rules, and thus invalidating the statutory and constitutional provisions
as applied to agency rules and regulations, is that the constitution requires
the same vote "required for enactment of [the] law."'' 77 Agency rules
are not "enacted" but are "promulgated" by the governing agency.
Since agency rules and regulations are not "enacted" by the legislature,
the vote requirement cannot be met, and therefore, the suspension is
not valid.
One commentator has suggested a number of options besides the
legislative veto which lessen the need for its use. 78 The most frequent
suggestion is for the legislature to withhold appropriations when it is
dissatisfied with the actions of an agency. Another suggestion is to
require agencies to report annually to the legislature during some type
of "oversight" committee review in which agency heads would be re-
quired to give an accounting of their actions. Finally, there is a suggestion
for a legislatively appointed "super agency" in the executive branch that
could review all rules. In light of Green,1"9 the legislature could probably
appoint such a committee in Louisiana as long as the legislature did
not have substantial control over it.
174. La. Const. art. III, § 20 (emphasis added).
175. 347 So. 2d 147 (La. 1977).
176. Id. at 151-52.
177. La. Const. art III, § 20.
178. Slater, supra note 70, at 153-57.
179. State Bd. of Ethics for Elected Officials v. Green, 545 So. 2d 1031 (La. 1989),
on rehearing 566 So. 2d 623 (La. 1990).
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D. Constitutional Environmental Mandate
The courts must also evaluate the exercise of the suspension power
over environmental laws and agency regulations in' light of Save Our-
selves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Commission.1'° The
court suggested that all environmental laws and regulations should be
considered in relationship to the "public trust" doctrine contained in
the Louisiana Constitution, article IX, section 1. The court relied upon
the "shall"'' language in the constitutional provision to emphasize the
importance of the legislature's carrying out of the mandate. Justice
Dennis indicated that the legislature's environmental enactments should
be based on "reasonable" decisions and made after "full and careful
considerations."' 2 Consequently, the reasons the legislature suspends
environmental laws and regulations should be weighed against the "public
trust" doctrine.
Furthermore, suspensions are similar to repeals, and the legislature
should be subject to a stricter standard than Save Ourselves. Since Save
Ourselves dealt with the initial enactment of environmental regulations,
the courts may adopt a stricter standard for judging the legislative repeal
of environmental laws. The legislature enacts environmental laws for the
public good, and once these are passed, the repeal or suspension is
likely to be contradictory to the public good and the "public trust"
doctrine. For this reason, the legislature should be subject to a higher
level of scrutiny when it repeals and suspends environmental laws and
regulations than when it creates them, and greater weight should be
given to the "public trust" doctrine. The stricter standard prevents hasty
repeals of laws which were intended to be for the "public trust" orig-
inally and prevents the legislature from easily changing its mind without
careful consideration. Justice Barham, in his dissent in the original
hearing of State v. Placid Oil Co.,' 3 which the court reversed on
rehearing, stated the importance of the "public trust" doctrine when
he said:
In this day and time, when environment, ecology, and conservation
of natural resources are of such vital concern to the public, at
this time when public lands and lands for the use in common are
rapidly disappearing, at this time when society appears on the
verge of desecrating the last vestige of the natural environment
of this country, it is most important as a matter of public policy
180. 452 So. 2d 1152 (1984).
181. La. Const. art III, § 1.
182. Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1157.
183. State v. Placid Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 154 (La. 1974).
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that we make every attempt to conserve for the public as much
of the vital natural resources as the law will permit.'8
E. Recommended Test
The courts must adopt a "strict scrutiny" ' test when evaluating
suspensions of environmental regulations and laws. A strict scrutiny test
would keep the suspension power confined within very narrow constraints,
where the drafters of the concept intended it to remain. A high level of
scrutiny would force the legislature to express a "compelling state interest"M
before it could validly suspend any environmental regulations and would
limit use of the suspension power to legitimate exercises of the state's
"police power" and emergency situations. Limiting the suspension power
to a small number of situations ensures that the separation of powers
balance between the executive and legislative branches is preserved and
that the environmental mandate emanating from the "public trust" doctrine
is preserved. A narrow construction allows it to be used in situations
which are truly justified.'1
By adopting the stricter standard, the suspension power will more
closely resemble that originally envisioned by the drafters of the English
Bill of Rights and copied into the Louisiana Constitution. The power was
intended to address extreme situations when the normal lawmaking process
could not adequately address the need to suspend laws. Traditionally,
people understood the suspension power to be exercised to confront "emer-
gency" situations such as wars and natural disasters. Due to the potential
for abuse when put in the hands of the executive branch, the drafters of
the Louisiana Constitution saw fit to put this extraordinary power in the
hands of the people through their legislative representatives. However, the
potential for abuse still exists and was even addressed by delegates to the
Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973. Therefore, the exercise should
be severely limited to those situations where some harm would result from
not having to subject a change in the law to the usual checks and balances
inherent in the protections set forth by the Louisiana Constitution.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The ability of the Louisiana legislature to suspend environmental laws
and agency regulations raises serious questions about the limits of the
184. Id. at 171 (Barham, J., dissenting).
185. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1988).
186. Id. at 415.
187. A similar approach has been taken by the federal courts in limiting the exceptions
to the "notice and comment" provisions of the Federal Administrative Act. 5 U.S.C. §
553(b)(B) and § 553(d)(3). The provisions require "good cause" before an agency can
by-pass the normal procedures and are usually limited to-emergency situations. See Northern
Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel, 808 F.2d 741, 751-52 (10th Cir. 1987).
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suspension power embodied in Article III, Section 20 of the Louisiana
Constitution. If not limited, the suspension power has the potential to
circumvent the gubernatorial veto power and violate the principles of the
separation of powers doctrine embodied in the Louisiana Constitution since
1812.
Originally designated as a right to protect the citizens against the
executive branch, the suspension power now has the possibility of being
abused by the legislature. This is the same body which the constitutional
drafters acknowledged as guardian of this right of the people. The Louis-
iana courts have not directly addressed the problem of the legislature
abusing this power and using it against the other co-equal branches of
government. The courts can check that abuse and prevent the creation of
situations that are contrary to the public good.
The courts already have the tools to limit the discretion exercised by
the legislature in wielding the suspension power. First, they can engage in
a traditional "separation of powers" analysis to limit the power and prevent
usurpation of the executive powers. Second, the courts should consider
the "give-and-take" that may have to occur when the legislature delegates
authority to an administrative agency in the executive branch. Third, the
courts may separately address the statutory suspension/nullification pro-
vision of the LAPA as a legislative veto. Finally, when dealing with
environmental laws and regulations, the courts must evaluate the limits in
light of the environmental public trust doctrine and the legislature's duty
as guardian. With those factors in mind, the courts will be able to strike
a balance that benefits both the executive and legislative branches, prevents
undue influence of special interest groups, and does not threaten the
environment of the state.
To establish limits to the suspension power, the courts must adopt a
"strict scrutiny" evaluation of all exercises of the power. The high level
of judicial scrutiny will ensure that the power is not used except during
"emergencies" and legitimate exercises of the state's "police power," and
thus ensure that the constitutional drafters' original intent is preserved.
With this standard, the courts will be able to prevent legislative abuses
of the suspension power and limit the legislature's expanding reliance upon





List of Proposed Legislative Resolutions Suspending or Nullifying




(Author: Guzzardo) Directs the Department of Environmental
Quality to grant dairy farmers a two-year extension of time to
establish "no runoff" oxidation ponds.
HCR-1O1:
(Author: Hopkins) Suspends the toxic air pollutant emissions
control program.
HCR-104:
(Author: Dale Smith) Suspends certain laws and nullifies certain
regulations concerning the take and possession limits for black
bass.
Suspends the authority of the Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries
Commission to reduce the daily take and possession limits on
black bass below 15 and suspends its authority to issue special
permits to tournament participants to take black bass in excess
of the legal limits.
Nullifies the rules and regulations of the Louisiana Wildlife
and Fisheries Commission that reduce the daily take and pos-
session limits on black bass below 15 and nullifies provisions
to issue special permits to tournament participants to take black
bass in excess of the legal limits.
Senate Concurrent Resolutions
SCR-20:
(Author: Rayburn) Directs the Department of Environmental
Quality to grant dairy farmers a two-year extension of the time
to establish "no runoff" qxidation ponds.
SCR-31:
(Author: Brinkhaus) Suspends LAC 33:IX.70-8 et seq., prom-
ulgated under R.S. 30:2074(C), as it relates to open bays and
deltaic passes for the discharge of produced waters.
SCR-50:
(Author: Brinkhaus) Suspends that portion of the Water Re-
sources law which prohibit the discharge of produced water.
Suspends R.S. 30:2074(B)(l),(3),(4), and (5) and LAC 33:IX.708
et seq., relative to the prohibition of the discharge of produced
water and spent drilling fluid.
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Suspends these rules and regulations until the Department of
Energy scientific study is completed.
Requires the Secretary of the Department of Environmental
Quality to repromulgate rules and regulations if necessary after
the DOE findings are published.
SCR-67:
(Author: Crain) Suspends the toxic air pollutant emission control
program.
SCR-69:
(Author: Chabert) Suspends the law providing authority to the
Department of Environmental Quality to regulate, control, or
prohibit certain discharges by shrimp processors until the leg-
islature has an opportunity to review, and make statutory amend-
ments concerning, new regulations.
SCR-145:
(Author: Crain) Suspends the authority of the Department of
Environmental Quality to set dioxin criteria below their current
levels.
Suspends that portion of R.S. 30:2074(B) which authorizes the
Department of Environmental Quality to set dioxin levels lower
than those already imposed until 60 days after final adjournment
of the 1992 regular legislative session to enable the department
to review the favorable science currently being developed on
dioxin.
SCR-171:
Suspends laws which authorize the Secretary of the Department
of Environmental Quality to grant permit for public solid or
hazardous waste disposal facility or landfill in certain locations.
Suspends until January 1, 1992, that portion of the law which
authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Environmental
Quality to grant permit for public solid or hazardous waste
disposal facility or public solid waste or sanitary landfill within
two miles of the corporate limits of any municipality or the
nearest boundary line of any property on which is located a
public elementary or secondary school or health care facility
licensed by the state.
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